The "Death of Man": Foucault and Anti-Humanism by Han-Pile, B
1 
 
 
                                                     
[DRAFT: THIS VERSION MAY DIFFER IN MINOR WAYS FROM THE PUBLISHED VERSION (FORTHCOMING 
IN FOUCAULT AND PHILOSOPHY, ED. T. O’LEARY, BLACKWELL), IN WHICH CASE THE LATTER SHOULD 
BE CONSIDERED AS AUTHORITATIVE] 
 
The ‘Death of Man’: Foucault and Humanism 
 
 Like many of the ‘–ism’ words criticised by Heidegger, humanism is a concept which is as 
widely used as it is indeterminate. Both its extension and value are subject to significant 
variations. In the English-speaking world, it is often associated with an optimistic and secular view 
of the world which asserts the privilege of human beings over non organic (or organic but non 
human) entities and defends the rights of human beings to happiness and to the development of 
their individual potential.1 Yet on the continent, and in particular in France and Germany, at the 
time of the ‘death of man’ humanism was seen by many as a dirty word, partly because of its 
implied anthropocentrism and partly due to some dubious political associations (the term was used 
by totalitarian regimes to justify their practices).2 After the post war enthusiasm for existentialism 
a wave of anti-humanism arose, led in Germany by Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, which 
denounced the understanding of the essence of man presupposed by humanism as metaphysical. 
In France, the controversy about humanism was closely associated with the debates surrounding 
structuralism and with four main figures: Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Althusser and Foucault himself. 
Other players in the field of anti-humanism were literary theorists such as M. Blanchot (who 
emphasised the self generating character of language over the role of the writer in the production 
1 Thus the American Humanist Association defines humanism as ‘a progressive philosophy of life that, 
without theism and other supernatural beliefs, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of 
personal fulfilment that aspire to the greater good of humanity.’ 
(http://www.americanhumanist.org/humanism/). Its British counterpart states that ‘the Humanist view of 
life is progressive and optimistic, in awe of human potential, living without fear of judgement and death, 
finding enough purpose and meaning in life, love and leaving a good legacy.’ 
(http://www.humanism.org.uk/site/cms/). See also S. Puledda, Interpretations of Humanism: Western 
Humanisms from the Renaissance to the Present, Latitude Press (1997), p. 1 (‘we find the term humanism 
used to indicate any current of thought that affirms the centrality, value and dignity of the human being or 
that manifests a primary concern in the life and situation of the human being in the world’) or K. Soper, 
Humanism and Anti-Humanism, London: Hutchinson and co, 1992, p.1 sq.  
2 See for example: ‘you know that this is precisely this humanism which served to justify, in 1948, Stalinism 
and the hegemony of Christian democracy, that it is the very humanism that can be found in Camus or in 
Sartre’s existentialism (…). This humanism has constituted, in a certain way, the small prostitute of the 
whole thought, the whole culture, the whole morals of the last twenty years’ (DE I 615-616 [RC: 99]). 
Interestingly, Sartre shares some of these views: ‘we have no right to believe that humanity is something to 
which we could set up a cult, after the manner of Auguste Comte. The cult of humanity ends in Comtian 
humanism, shut-in upon itself, and – this must be said – in Fascism’ (Sartre 1973: 55).   
C:\Documents and Settings\beatrice\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\OLK544\The 'Death of Man' - Foucault and Humanism.doc 10/20/09 + 9:30 
AM 
2 
 
 
                                                     
of literary pieces3) or historians from the Ecole des Annales like F. Braudel.4 Although these 
thinkers differed widely in their disciplines, assumptions and conclusions, they all denied the 
primacy of man, be it as an epistemological starting point (the subject as the foundation of all 
possible knowledge, as in Husserlian phenomenology) or as a practical agent (freedom as the main 
operator and focus of historical development as in Hegelian history). Correlatively, they 
emphasised the part played by unconscious structures in the determination of thought and 
behaviour: the ‘author’ was redefined by Foucault as a ‘function’ of the texts rather than their 
source5; Althusser re-described human agents as ‘bearers’ (Träger) of historical determination, not 
as the actors of history.6 Braudel introduced the idea of multiple durations at work in history, of 
which ‘eventful’ [événementielle], human history was only the most superficial.7  
 Thus French anti-humanism entailed, generally speaking, a denunciation both of 
foundationalism and of an Enlightenment-inspired, progressivist view of history as the result of 
the actions of autonomous agents. In Foucault's case, much of the controversy focused on his 
provocative statements about man being a ‘recent invention’ promised to an imminent ‘death’ 
(OT: 386) and threatened with erasure like a ‘face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea’ (OT: 
387). 8 Yet it would be mistaken to think that there was much uniformity in the anti-humanist 
camp, or that there was agreement on a positive definition of an alternative model to humanism. 
3 See for example one of Blanchot’s seminal texts, The Space of Literature, University of Nebraska Press; 
1990.  
4 Both Blanchot and Braudel were central to Foucault’s interests. He wrote a short book about the first 
(Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from the Outside, Zone Books; 1990). The Archaeology of Knowledge 
opens with a reference to ‘great motionless grounds’ recently uncovered in history, a clear allusion to 
Braudel’s work on duration. Foucault mentions Braudel explicitly in DE I : 607 (RC 92): ‘one of the most 
famous contemporary historians, Braudel, cannot be seen as a partisan of linear history, in which 
consciousness plays a dominant part’. On Foucault’s views on language and his relation to Blanchot, see for 
example B. Han, ‘Literature and the Thought of the Outside in Foucault and Blanchot’, in the Journal of the 
Institute of Romance Studies (vol. 3, fall 1994). On the Ecole des Annales, see F. Dosse, New History in 
France: The Triumph of the ‘Annales’, Chicago: university of Illinois Press, 1994.   
5 Foucault : ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?’, DE I: 789-820 [AME : 205-222]. 
6 ‘The structure of the relations of production determines the places and functions occupied and adopted by 
the agents of production, who are never anything more than the occupants of such places, insofar as they 
are the supports (Träger) of these functions. The true ‘subjects’ (in the sense of the constitutive subjects of 
the process) are therefore not these occupants or functionaries, are not, despite all appearances, the ‘real 
men’ but the definition and distribution of these places and functions’ (Althusser, Reading Capital, London: 
1968, p. 180).  
7 See for example F. Braudel : Preface to the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of 
Philip II, Fontana/Collins, 1975.  
8 See also various passages in OT : ‘It is not so long ago when the world, its order, and human beings existed, 
but man did not.’ [322]; ‘No philosophy, no political or moral option, no empirical science of any kind, no 
observation of the human body, no analysis of sensation, imagination and the passions, had ever 
encountered, in the 17th or 18th centuries, anything like man: for man did not exist (any more than life, 
language or labour).’ [344]; ‘Man is a recent invention within [European culture].’ [386] 
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Foucault categorically denied that he was a structuralist9; he claimed to differ from Lévi-Strauss 
because of his interest in actual, not virtual systems10; and unlike Althusser, he did not believe that 
our historical development is dependent solely on causal determination.11 Yet (as illustrated by the 
above distinctions) he was often keener on defining his position a contrario than on providing a 
positive set of criteria. Furthermore the polemical context of the quarrel led him and others to 
publish occasionally excessive statements which in retrospect stand out more by virtue of their 
provocative character than because of their intellectual perspicaciousness. In this paper, I shall try 
to avoid rhetorical heat, and will refrain from defending either humanism or anti-humanism. I am 
more interested in the debate itself. Controversial, often acerbic dialogues between 
contemporaries are not rare in the history of philosophy ⎯  think Hegel-Schelling; Heidegger-
Carnap; Rawls-Habermas. Yet the philosophical interest of such controversies often lies as much 
in what is presupposed by each of the interlocutors as in what is explicitly said. If one examines 
the assumptions of each proponent, such debates often appear to rest on mutual 
misunderstandings; and unless these are identified, it is impossible for the external observer to 
take a stand on the issues in question or to discern whether the heat of the intellectual battle 
covers the possibility of a deeper agreement.  
 Thus I do not propose to enter the debate about the death of man but to bring to light its 
theoretical underpinnings. To my knowledge, this hasn’t been done so far. Those who have 
written on Foucault’s anti-humanism have tended to focus on its relation to Heidegger’s critique 
of cartesianism and/or on the Foucault/Habermas controversy.12 In an important paper,13 N. Frazer 
9 See AK, chapters 1 and 5. 
10 See AK, chapter 5. 
11 See for example : ‘Sartre and Garaudy want me to talk exclusively about causality. But precisely because of 
this they narrow down the field of exploration (...). In the Order of Things I haven’t covered at all this 
vertical dimension [the ‘relations which can exist between a type of knowledge and social, political, 
economic and historical conditions in which such knowledge is constituted], only the horizontal dimension’ 
(DE I : 656). This concern for avoiding reductionism was maintained throughout Foucault’s work: see DE 
IV: 77 [P: 278]: ‘the type of intelligibility which I am trying to produce cannot be reduced to the projection 
of say, a socio-economic history, over a natural phenomenon so that it appears as the necessary and extrinsic 
product of this cause’.  
12 For an example of the first, see D. Hoy, ‘Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault, Lukes and the Frankfurt 
School’ (Triquarterly 52, Fall 1981, 43-63); for an example of the second, see A. Honneth, The Critique of 
Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory, transl. K. Baynes, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991, chapter 
6. There is also a significant amount of feminist critiques of humanism (often putting forward variations of 
the idea that ‘masculine’ values such as autonomy and freedom must be supplemented with ‘feminine’ 
values such as care or relatedness), some of which make explicit references to Foucault. See for example Jana 
Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power and the Body, New York: Routledge, 1991, chapter 5. As 
in the case of the above, such criticisms tend to focus on Foucault's genealogical work. 
13 N. Frazer, ‘Michel Foucault: A ‘Young Conservative’?’, in  Critique and Power, ed. M. Kelly, Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1994, p.185-211. 
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distinguished between three possible grounds for Foucault’s rejection of humanism: a) ‘conceptual 
or philosophical’ (humanism as too entangled in Western subject-focused metaphysics), b) 
strategic (the appeal to humanist values as covering up strategies of domination) and c) normative 
(humanism as being intrinsically objectionable, on the ground that subjection is per se a form of 
subjugation). These three possibilities are supposed to correspond to the three main stages of 
Foucault’s philosophical development (archaeology, genealogy and the history of subjectivity). 
With respect to this useful nomenclature, the reading I propose in this paper is, roughly speaking, 
conceptual: it argues that Foucault's rejection of humanism was motivated by his philosophical 
analyses of the aporia of the anthropological turn and the analytic of finitude, and that some of the 
bitterness of the ‘death of man’ debate was due to the fact that such analyses were grievously 
misunderstood by his opponents. However my position differs from Frazer’s in at least three 
respects: a) it focuses mostly on Foucault's early work, b) it does not argue from parallels between 
Foucault and Heidegger but seeks to identify internally the philosophical grounds for Foucault’s 
rejection of humanism, and c) contrary to Frazer, I suggest that the later Foucault’s work, far from 
being a hardening of his early position (from a ‘merely conceptual’, as she puts it, to a strongly 
normative but in her view untenable position), offers the possibility of a reconciliation by 
sketching out a position which, rather than rejecting tout court such values as freedom or self-
creation, upholds them as ideals but seeks to construe them in non metaphysical ways.    
 
 Let us first get an idea of the nature and tone of the debate. The extent of the indignation and 
misunderstandings generated by Foucault's somewhat conspicuous declarations about the death of 
man can be illustrated by the following passages, taken from two of the most vocal proponents of 
humanism: Garaudy, dubbed a ‘soft’ Marxist (DE I 541), and Sartre, the ‘19th century 
philosopher’14.  
 
When he tells us that man is a creation of the end of the 18th century, I would like Foucault 
to explain us where he is going to locate Augustine’s Confessions or even the research of the 
Greek fathers who, from the notion of the divine person, and then from Christology, arrived 
at the notion of the human person. (Garaudy 1994: 380) 
  
‘Man’ does not exist, and Marx had rejected him long before Foucault or Lacan when he said: 
‘I don’t see any man, I only see workers, bourgeois, intellectuals’. If one persists in calling 
‘subject’ a sort of substantial I (...) then the subject has been dead for a long time. But the 
14 ‘The Critique de la raison dialectique is the magnificent and pathetic effort of a man from the 19th century 
to think the 20th century. From that perspective, Sartre is the last Hegelian, I would even say the last 
Marxist’. (DE I : 542).  
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initial decentering which makes man disappears behind the structures implies in itself a form 
of negativity, and man surges from this negation. There is a subject, or a subjectivity if you 
prefer, as soon as there is an effort to overcome while retaining a given situation. (Sartre 1994: 
70) 
 
While they are both opposed to Foucault’s conclusions in the Order of Things, it is doubtful that 
Garaudy and Sartre would have agreed as to why. Firstly, they each have something quite 
different in mind when they speak of ‘man’: Garaudy is referring to the religious notion of the 
human person as a bearer of rights endowed with a special status (a conception further developed 
by Kant’s focus on the capacity of rational beings for self-government and the moral worth that 
derives from it, by opposition to ‘mere things’ which have a price but no intrinsic value). By 
contrast, Sartre rejects such moral abstractions and sees man in a secular way, as ‘surging from 
negation’. This ‘surge’ alludes to Being and Nothingness’ definition of consciousness as a nihilating 
power which separates itself from the world through the very movement by which it projects 
itself into it. As pure negation, consciousness cannot be identified with any of the contents that 
are given to it (it has no essence)15; nor can it be determined by them. Thus at a historical level, 
agents may be dependent on their socio-economical insertion (their ‘situation’) but the latter can 
be ‘overcome’ through practical engagement.16 While there is possible overlap between the two 
conceptions, it is clear that they do not coincide. Secondly, the grounds of the two objections are 
different: Garaudy is accusing Foucault of historical inaccuracy17 while Sartre is defending the 
primacy of freedom both as a causally determining principle and as an historical explanatory 
category, thus rejecting the idea that agents may be unconsciously determined by structures which 
pre-exist them and on which they have no power. But beyond these differences, the crucial issue 
is that both critics miss the point of what Foucault means by ‘man’: he does not refer to the 
‘human person’, nor to any ‘substantial I’, nor to free consciousness. To understand this, one needs 
15 (Of course, the question is open of whether one can successfully refute the idea of an essence of man and 
yet provide a definition of man. That it doesn’t pick out empirical features does not mean that no essential 
properties are assigned). 
16 ‘For me man is the product of the structure but only insofar as he overcome it. (; Man receives the 
structures (…) but he receives them insofar as he is himself engaged in history, and engaged in such a way 
that he cannot not destroy them to constitute new ones which, in turn, will determine him’ (Sartre 1994: 
72). 
17 A line of attack in which he wasn’t alone. See for example: G. S. Rousseau: ‘Whose Enlightenment? Not 
Man’s. The Case of Michel Foucault’, Eighteenth Century Studies, n°6 (1972-73): 283-286; G. Huppert, 
‘Divinatio and Eruditio: Thoughts on Foucault’, History and Theory, n°3 (1974). For Foucault’s responses, 
see: ‘Monstrosities in Criticism’, DE II: 214 sq [the English translation by R.J. Matthews can be found in 
Diacritics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn, 1971), pp. 57-60].   
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to look at the complex account of the connection between the appearance of ‘man’, humanism and 
anthropology proposed by the Order of Things.  
 The first thing to note is that for the early Foucault humanism has a very specific, narrow 
referent. This is indicated by his rather surprising historical reconstruction of its birth, which is 
referred to the Enlightenment18 and not, as is more traditional, to the revival and reinterpretation 
of the Ciceronian notion of humanitates during the Renaissance19: thus the first humanists on 
Foucault’s list are not Rabelais, Montaigne or Pico Della Mirandola but Kant, Hegel and Marx.20 
‘The Humanist movement’, he tells us, ‘dates from the end of the 19th century. Secondly, when 
one looks a little closely at the cultures of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, one realises that man 
literally has no place in them. Culture is then preoccupied with God, the world and the 
resemblance of things’ (ibidem).21 Garaudy would probably have thrown up his hands in the air in 
despair at this statement, which flies in the face of common sense and of the received view of the 
history of humanism. After all there were human beings on this planet long before the 19th 
century, and references about man abound in Renaissance and subsequent texts (and prior 
writings such as Genesis…). To understand this paradox, one needs to locate Foucault’s analyses at 
the appropriate level: ‘at the archaeological level, which reveals the general, historical a priori of 
each of these branches of knowledge [the human sciences], modern man ⎯ that man assignable in 
his corporeal, labouring and speaking existence ⎯ is only possible as a configuration of finitude’ 
(OT: 317). As we shall see, the situation is complicated by the fact that the new understanding of 
finitude itself is referred to… man.22 But for the moment, note that the shift to the archaeological 
level provides us with the key to understanding Foucault’s provocative statements about the death 
of man: one must distinguish between surface understandings of man (for example as a living, 
working, speaking being) and man as the new historical a priori that underlies our comprehension 
of the first. Thus ‘man’s mode of being as constituted in modern thought enables it to play two 
18 Strictly speaking, this is more or less correct: the Encyclopedia Britannica indicates that the word 
‘humanism’ was first employed (as humanismus) by 19th-century German scholars to designate the 
Renaissance emphasis on classical studies in education.  
19 For more traditional interpretations of Renaissance humanism, see Puledda (1997) or Nauert, C, 
Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2006. 
20 Thus Foucault rejects the ‘high school’ narrative according to which ‘humanism would have first appeared 
during the 16th century, would have been developed through the classical age’s reworking of the notion of 
human nature before finding its crowning point in the development of the positive sciences of man at the 
end of the 18th century (DE I: 540). 
21 See also : ‘insofar as what existed in classical knowledge were representations ordered in a discourse, all 
the notions that are fundamental for our conception of man, such as that of life, labour and language, had 
(...) no place. Man existed where discourse became quiet’ (DE I: 498 [FL: 16]). 
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roles: he is at the same time the foundation of all positivities and at the same time present in the 
element of empirical things. (...) It is not a matter of man’s essence in general but simply of that 
historical a priori which, since the 19th century, has served as an almost self-evident ground for 
our thought’ (OT: 344).  Just as each épistémè makes possible the appearance of specific objects 
and theories, in the same way man in the archaeological sense is the condition of possibility of the 
current conceptions of man. Yet precisely for this reason, it is not synonymous with any of these 
understandings: ‘Renaissance ‘humanism’ and Classical ‘rationalism’ were indeed able to allot 
human beings a privileged position in the order of the world, but they were not able to conceive 
of man’ (OT: 318). It is because they missed this crucially narrow archaeological meaning in the 
Order of Things that both Sartre and Garaudy failed to understand and thus to criticise Foucault’s 
position adequately. In their defence, such a mistake was facilitated by the fact that Foucault 
himself used the same term to refer both to the epistemic structure and to its empirical content ⎯ 
in what follows, I shall try to prevent such confusions from arising by referring to the first as 
‘man’ and to the second as man.23
 Yet so far the distinction between ‘man’ and man is purely formal. To give it content, and to 
assess its relevance to humanism, one must elucidate what Foucault actually means by ‘man’ as the 
empirico-transcendental double, its connection to anthropology and its role in the analytic of 
finitude. Let us start with the first. In order to get a grip on the matter, we must remember 
Foucault’s analyses of the previous épistémè, namely that the classical age. Without entering into 
unnecessary details,24 his view is that during that period representation was both the ground and 
the privileged medium of knowledge: to be known was to be represented adequately.25 
Conversely, beings were, at least in principle, fully representable, and the general aim of 
knowledge consisted in perfecting the best method to differentiate and arrange representations so 
 
22 ‘Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that 
knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible’ (OT: 317). 
23 There is an additional reason for the confusion: while it would be natural, in English, to use the neutral 
pronoun ‘it’ to refer to the structure, and the masculine ‘he’ for man as an empirical agent, in French there is 
no neutral, except in very few cases (such as ‘il pleut’ [it is raining] or ‘il y a’ [there is]). Thus in Foucault’s 
texts the same masculine pronoun is used to denote both the structure (‘man’) and the individual (man). At 
the risk of artificiality in translation, I shall try to disentangle this ambiguity inasmuch as possible by 
substituting the neutral for the masculine when appropriate.   
24 For more details, see for example B. Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the 
Historical, Stanford: Stanford UP: 2001, in particular part I. See also B. Han-Pile, ‘Analytic of Finitude and 
the History of Subjectivity’, in the Cambridge Companion to Foucault (ed. Gary Gutting, Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2005) 
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that they would reflect the real order of things in the world (hence Descartes’ emphasis on the 
establishment of systematic differences between representations and the classical age’s obsession 
with the table as a synoptic form of knowledge). By contrast, the birth of ‘man’ is due to the 
Copernican turn, whereby the focus shifted from representations to the representing subject. As it 
is well known, Kant’s new thought was that it might be more profitable, in order to securely 
ground empirical knowledge and answer the sceptic’s challenge, to look into the activity of 
representing itself, with a view to finding out whether any a priori conditions could be identified 
that would hold for any possible representational content. If this was the case, then the presence 
of such universal and necessary constraints on our representations would be enough to guarantee 
the possibility of their validity in the empirical realm.26 According to Foucault, this move from the 
post hoc to the a priori had two notable consequences: firstly, ‘the very being of what is 
represented fell outside of representation itself’ (OT: 240). Secondly, and more importantly for our 
present topic, the Copernican turn gave rise to a new understanding of ‘man’ as the empirico-
transcendental double. As a transcendental subject, ‘man’ is the foundation of empirical 
knowledge: to be known is still to be represented, but in order to count as candidates for true 
knowledge, representations must conform to the epistemic conditions laid out in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental analytic. 27 Yet at the same time, ‘man’ is also a 
possible object of representation within the field opened up by such epistemic conditions: thus we 
represent ourselves in space (we see our own bodies) and in time (we can be conscious of our 
 
25 See for example: ‘the threshold between Classicism and modernity ⎯ (...) let us say between our pre-
history and what is still contemporary ⎯ had been definitely crossed when words ceased to intersect with 
representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things’ (OT: 304).  
26 Foucault refers to this attempt in the following passage: ‘instead of basing the connection between 
representations on a foundation arrived at by a sort of internal hollowing out process [a reference to the 
work of Ideologists such as Condillac], (...) Kant establishes it on the conditions that define its universally 
valid form. (...) Any connection, if it is to be universal, must have its foundation beyond all experience, in 
the a priori that renders it possible. Not that it is a question of another world, but of the conditions in 
accordance with which any representation of the world in general can exist’ (OT: 242). 
27 The notion of ‘epistemic condition’ is borrowed from H. Allison (Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: an 
Interpretation and Defence, New Haven: Yale UP, 1983, p. 10-13). It refers to a ‘condition that is necessary 
for the representation of an object or an objective state of affairs’. Allison also refers to such conditions as 
‘objectivating conditions’ as they are that by virtue of which our representations possess objective reality. In 
the Critique, epistemic conditions are comprised of the a priori forms of sensibility (space and time) and of 
the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories). Such conditions must be distinguished from: a) 
logical conditions (such as the principle of non contradiction), which rule consistent thinking; b) 
psychological conditions, which refer to particular aspects of the human cognitive apparatus that help 
provide a genetic account of why we perceive things in certain ways (these can include physiological 
factors). Contrary to epistemic conditions, these cannot account for the objective validity of a representation 
(although they may contribute to explaining its empirical formation); c) ontological conditions, namely the 
conditions of possibility of the being of things. 
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internal states). In Foucault’s words, ‘man appeared as an object of possible knowledge (...) and at 
the same time as the being through which all knowledge is possible’ (DE I: 607 [RC: 93]). Note, 
however, that at this point the two aspects of the double are neatly dissociated ⎯ thus in the 
Critique there is no overlap between the empirical ‘I’ of our self apprehension in the form of the 
internal sense on the one hand, and the transcendental ‘I’ of the ‘I think’ of transcendental 
apperception on the other.   
 Yet the analytic of finitude threatens this neat separation between the two halves of the 
double and gives the Copernican turn its further, anthropological twist. This, for Foucault, was 
prefigured in Kant’s shift from the first Critique to the Anthropology: ‘from Kant onwards (...) 
there is nothing but finitude, and it is in this sense that the Kantian critique carried with itself the 
possibility ⎯ or the peril ⎯ of anthropology’ (DE I: 446 [AME: 257]). To understand this peril, 
one must, again, back track a little to the pre-Kantian understanding of finitude. Foucault points 
out that during the classical age, the notion of the infinite was both central and primary: thus for 
Descartes one can prove the existence of God by the presence of the idea of the infinite in the 
finite. The underlying assumption is that the infinite has ontological pre-eminence over the finite: 
in accordance with the Aristotelian/Thomist view that an effect cannot be superior to its cause, 
the only possible conclusion is that the idea of the infinite was placed in us by God. In a reversal of 
the Greek understanding of the apeiron, during the classical age the finite stands in a relation of 
ontological subordination to and logical derivation from the infinite. By contrast, for Foucault the 
hallmark of the anthropological turn is that human finitude, instead of being subordinated to 
God’s infinity, becomes self-foundational: ‘our culture’, he tells us, ‘crossed the threshold beyond 
which we recognise our modernity when finitude was conceived in an interminable cross-
reference with itself. (...) Modern culture can conceive of man because it conceives of the finite on 
the basis of itself’ (OT: 317). To understand this new self reference of finitude, let’s turn to the 
following passage: 
 
In one sense, man is governed by labour, life and language: his concrete existence finds its 
determinations in them. (...) [Yet] all those contents (...) have positivity within the space of 
knowledge (...) only because they are thoroughly imbued with finitude. For they would not 
be there (...) if man (...) was trapped in the mute (...) opening of animal life; but nor would 
they posit themselves in the acute angle that hides them from their own direction if man 
could traverse them without residuum in the lightning flash of an infinite understanding. 
That is to say that each of these forms in which man can learn that he is finite is given to him 
only against the background of his own finitude. Moreover, the latter is not the most 
completely purified essence of positivity, but that upon the basis of which it is possible for 
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positivity to arise. At the foundation of all the empirical positivities (...), we discover a 
finitude ⎯ which is in a sense the same (...) and yet is radically other. (OT: 313-4). 
 
The key to this difficult excerpt lies in distinguishing between two different senses of finitude 
(empirical and transcendental) and of determination (causal and epistemic28). The ‘governance’ of 
life, labour and language over our ‘concrete existence’ gives us a hint about the nature of what I 
have called elsewhere empirical finitude.29 It refers to causal determinations and resides in the fact 
that human beings are determined by various processes in which they find themselves enmeshed 
from the day of their birth and over which they have little control.  Each in their own way, such 
processes disclose various aspects of our empirical finitude: we cannot alter our biochemistry so as 
to become immune to illness or aging, nor can we use a private language. Thus labour, life and 
language are the ‘forms in which man can learn that he is [empirically] finite’. But such forms are 
also objects of knowledge (further refined in such disciplines as biology, economics or linguistics). 
In this, they are dependent on the transcendental aspect of ‘man’ which defines the conditions 
under which all empirical objects are epistemically determined. Life, language and labour, which 
are part of the limitations that bear causally on empirical finitude, only ‘have positivity within the 
space of knowledge’ because they are ‘thoroughly imbued with finitude’: yet crucially, such 
finitude must now be conceived of at the transcendental level. Foucault refers it to our 
impossibility of ‘traversing [such contents] without residuum in the lightning flash of an infinite 
understanding’. This is clearly an allusion to Kant’s definition of the intuitus originarius as the sort 
of intellect which would not be dependent on the reception of sensory material and could by itself 
produce a fully spontaneous knowledge of its object. Such an intellect would be infinite (‘the 
lightning flash of an infinite understanding’) and acquire an immediate and perfect knowledge of 
its objects (‘without residuum’). Yet while such intellectual intuition may be appropriate to 
characterise God’s mode of knowing, it is not open to human beings. Thus transcendental finitude 
is no empirical matter (it is not the ‘completely purified essence of positivity’); it resides in the fact 
that we cannot form any empirical knowledge unless we receive some external input, usually 
28 A determination is causal if it refers to the action of a cause, in such a way that the existence of the effect 
depends on that of the cause and the cause must be chronologically prior to (or at least simultaneous with) 
the effect. By contrast, a determination is epistemic (in an Allisonian sense) if it refers to the application of 
an a priori condition to the representation of an object. Such determination has no efficacious power and 
does not occur in time (although they can be defined in isolation of any given empirical content, epistemic 
conditions do not pre-exist their objects but are instantiated in them): it is a condition of intelligibility, not 
of existence.  
29 See B. Han-Pile, Heidegger and Foucault on Kant and Finitude’, in A. Milchman (ed.), Critical Encounters 
: Heidegger/Foucault, (Indianapolis: Indiana UP), 2003. 
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through time and space but at least through time: although we are capable of spontaneous activity 
(for example in synthesising the manifold under the pure concepts of reason), the process whereby 
we acquire knowledge is not fully active. Yet precisely because it is thus limited, transcendental 
finitude provides the epistemic conditions (‘that upon which it is possible for positivity to arise’) 
which allow the contents that causally determine us as empirical beings to enter the space of 
knowledge. Note, crucially, that transcendental finitude differs from its empirical counterpart in 
that the limitation it entails can be analytically deduced from the very concept of the 
transcendental as a standpoint (with implies a specific perspective and thus limiting conditions, by 
opposition to a God’s eye view which would not be limited in such a way). By contrast, empirical 
finitude can only be understood synthetically, from empirical observations about the nature of 
human beings as living or speaking entities. 
 Thus ‘at the very heart of empiricity, there is indicated the obligation to work backwards to 
an analytic of finitude, in which man’s being will be able to provide a [transcendental] foundation 
(...) for all these forms that indicate to him that his is not [empirically] infinite’ (OT: 315). The 
problem, however, is that the ambiguity of ‘man’, which both separates and unites the empirical 
and the transcendental, causes the two forms of finitude to overlap by means of an implicit shift 
which makes epistemic determination ultimately dependent on its empirical, causal counterpart: 
the relation between transcendental and empirical finitude becomes a vicious circle. This shift is 
evoked, albeit somewhat obscurely, in the rest of the passage I originally quoted:  
 
[313] And he, as soon as he thinks, merely unveils himself in the form of a being who is 
already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible anteriority, a living being, and 
instrument of production, a vehicle for words which exist before him. All these contents (...) 
traverse him as if he were merely an object of nature.  
 
Note the multiple temporal locutions at work in this quote (‘as soon as he thinks’, ‘already’, ‘in an 
irreducible anteriority’, ‘which exist before him’). It may be tempting to understand the 
anteriority they connote from a purely empirical point of view, in which case the passage would 
refer to the empirical genesis of thought. Thought itself would be seen in a naturalistic way, as 
causally determined by empirical conditions (for example neuro-chemical processes that are 
specific to man as an empirical being). Yet the passage also indicates that ‘man’, although 
‘traversed’ by empirical contents, is not ‘merely an object of nature’. As we saw, the reason for this 
lies in the possibility of considering ‘man’ from a transcendental perspective. From such a 
standpoint, however, the temporal locutions acquire a new referent: they mark the opening of the 
epistemic field. By definition, such an opening should not itself be temporal ⎯ Foucault himself 
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points out that in the First Critique  representation has its ‘foundation beyond all experience, in 
the a priori that renders it possible’ (OT: 242, my italics). In the ‘Transcendental Aesthetics’, time 
is an a priori form of sensibility on which the possibility of conceiving chronological time 
depends: as a condition of possibility of experience, it cannot feature in the field that it 
determines.30 Yet the use of retrospective temporal locutions in the passage quoted cancels out this 
neat distinction by inscribing the opening of the epistemic field itself within the chronology of 
empirical time: thus the analytic of finitude is characterised by a paradox of retrospection whereby 
transcendental finitude is disclosed as pre-existing itself in the form of empirical finitude.31 Such 
pre-existence (which Derrida calls ‘primitivity’ in the case of Husserl’s phenomenology) 
invalidates ‘man’’s ability to provide a universal and necessary foundation for knowledge. The 
empirical contents that were previously deemed causally determinant but epistemically 
determined acquire a ‘quasi-transcendental’ function (OT: 244)32  in that they are now viewed as 
chronologically primary and causally determinant for epistemic conditions themselves. Thus man 
as a transcendental subject ‘unveils himself as already there, as a living being’ governed by the 
empirical laws of life, a speaking being using a language that prexists him. In other words, 
transcendental finitude and empirical finitude are superposed in such a way that the former, 
rather than being the analytic correlate of the notion of a transcendental standpoint, is now 
cashed out in terms of the synthetic, empirical limitations (life, language, labour) that bear 
causally on man. In Foucault’s words, ‘if man’s knowledge is finite, it is because he is trapped, 
without possibility of liberation, within the positive contents of language, labour and life [which 
thus indirectly become epistemically determinant]; (OT: 316). Consequently, this identification of 
transcendental and empirical finitude, of epistemic and causal determination, invalidates ‘man’’s 
ability to provide a universal and necessary foundation for knowledge. 
 Thus anthropology as an ‘analytic of man’ (OT: 340) has come to displace Kant’s critique. In a 
well known but obscure passage, Foucault refers to this anthropological doubling over of finitude 
over itself as the ‘Fold’:   
30 This impossibility is illustrated in the first Critique by the solution to the antinomy between freedom and 
causality in the ‘Transcendental Dialectics’: while our empirical actions are causally determined, inserted in 
temporal chains in which causes pre-exists their effects, noumenal freedom itself is timeless. Such 
timelessness is expressed by Kant’s reference to the choice of intelligible character, a choice which itself 
does not intervene within empirical time. 
31 This theme is developed through the study of the ‘originary’ in Foucault’s introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology (recently published in Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique et introduction à 
l’Anthropologie, Paris: Vrin, 2008. For an interpretation of the text, see B. Han-Pile (2001), part 1, chapter 1.  
32 NB: the English translation is somewhat unfortunate as it renders the French ‘quasi-transcendental’ with 
‘transcendental’ (with quotation marks). 
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[341] By means of this question [was ist der Mensch?] a form of reflection was constituted 
which is mixed in its levels and characteristic of modern philosophy. (...) It concerns an 
empirico-transcendental duplication by means of which an attempt is made to make the man 
of nature, of exchange, or of discourse, serve as the [transcendental] foundation of his own 
finitude.  
 
A large part of chapter 9 of the Order of Things is devoted to outlining the nefarious consequences 
of this ‘empirico-transcendental duplication’ both for post-Kantians and contemporary 
philosophy. Yet it may be advisable to stop at this point. Recall that this long analysis of the 
analytic of finitude had two aims: firstly, to clarify what Foucault meant by ‘man’ and thus to 
expose the misunderstandings underlying the debate about its death. Secondly, to help us 
understand how Foucault’s denunciation of ‘man’ may ground his rejection of humanism. While 
the first goal has (hopefully) been achieved, it is not clear that this is the case for the second: even 
if they accepted Foucault’s indictment of anthropology and of the analytic of finitude, humanists 
could still question its relevance to their own position altogether. Foucault tells us that after ‘man’ 
appeared as the ‘subject of all knowledge and object of a possible knowledge’, ‘such an ambiguous 
situation characterise[d] what one could call the anthropologico-humanist structure of 19th 
century thought’ (DE I: 607 [RC: 93]). Yet what is ‘humanist’ about this structure? Just as the 
‘death of man’ did not refer to actual human beings, in the same way it is very doubtful that when 
Sartre or Garaudy ⎯ or other humanists attacked by Foucault such as Teilhard de Chardin or 
Camus ⎯ spoke of man they meant the empirico-transcendental double. In the humanist 
literature, ‘man’ is much more likely to connote the dignity of the human person as an end in 
itself, the primacy of the subject (or of consciousness) or human freedom (the list not being 
exclusive). For example, the last two themes are central to Sartre’s own definition of ‘existentialist 
humanism’33: ‘since man is thus self-surpassing [a reference to man’s freedom as a nihilating 
power] and can grasp objects only in relation to his self-surpassing, he is himself the heart and 
centre of his transcendence. There is no other universe except the human universe, the universe 
of human subjectivity’ (Sartre 1973: 55). So how (if at all) is Foucault’s general denunciation of the 
‘anthropological sleep’ relevant to humanism?  
33 (by opposition to more traditional forms which ‘uphold man as the end-in-itself and as the supreme 
value’. The problem with such views, for Sartre, is that they rely on an essentialist understanding of man: ‘[it 
is not] admissible that man should pronounce judgment upon Man; Existentialism dispenses with judgments 
of this sort: an existentialist will never take man as the end, since man is still to be determined’. (Sartre 1973: 
55). 
C:\Documents and Settings\beatrice\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\OLK544\The 'Death of Man' - Foucault and Humanism.doc 10/20/09 + 9:30 
AM 
14 
 
 
 This problem is illustrated by the well-known passage below, which starts from a 
consideration of anthropology in general and concludes with a vitriolic attack against various 
forms of humanism:  
 
[342] Anthropology constitutes perhaps the fundamental arrangement that has governed and 
controlled the path of philosophical thought from Kant until our own day. This arrangement 
is essential, since it forms part of our history; but it is disintegrating before our eyes, since we 
are beginning to recognise and denounce in it, in a critical mode, both a forgetfulness of the 
opening that made it possible and a stubborn obstacle standing obstinately in the way of an 
imminent new form of thought. To all those who still wish to talk about man, about his reign 
or his liberation, to all those who still ask themselves questions about what man is in his 
essence, to all those who wish to take him as their starting point in their attempts to reach the 
truth, to all those who, on the other hands, refer all knowledge back to the truths of man 
himself (...), to all these warped and twisted forms of reflection we can only answer with a 
philosophical laugh ⎯ which means, to a certain extent, a silent one.  
 
For all its rhetorical power (and the undeniable attraction of silent philosophical laughter), the 
passage looks like a non sequitur: the Order of Things  has succeeded so well in narrowing the 
meaning of ‘man’ to the empirico-transcendental double that the gap between ‘man’ and its 
humanist incarnations seems fairly unbridgeable. Yet for Foucault’s critique of anthropology to 
bite on humanism, such a gap needs to be bridged. So what ought we do? One possibility would be 
to give up on hermeneutic charity altogether and conclude that Foucault is just as guilty of 
misunderstanding his opponents’ position that they were of misreading his. But this may be 
premature. Alternatively, one could attempt to show that in fact, ‘man’ and humanist man are 
synonymous ⎯ a dubious strategy in my view since so much of the thrust of Foucault’s analyses of 
the analytic of finitude is precisely devoted to identifying a specific meaning for ‘man’. Yet 
another, perhaps more promising possibility may be to suggest that since the analytic of finitude is 
supposed to be the epistemic ground of all subsequent thought developments, somehow there 
must be a relation of entailment between ‘man’ and man such that the second could be shown to 
be conceptually or at least historically dependent on the first. If this was the case, then Foucault’s 
criticism of ‘man’ would have genuine implications for theories that focus on human subjectivity, 
consciousness or freedom.  
 As Foucault never addressed this question, it is difficult to do more than provide a few 
pointers for such a strategy. Let’s start by taking stock of the extent of the task. As hinted at by the 
passage just quoted, Foucault’s denunciation of the anthropological turn branches into attacks 
against two main sets of targets: on the one hand, practical theories grounded in the idea of a 
‘reign of man’ or alternatively announcing his ‘liberation’, and on the other theoretical questions 
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about the essence of man assorted with attempts to use the latter as the alpha (a ‘starting point in 
their attempts to reach the truth’, e.g. a foundation for knowledge) or omega of knowledge (‘refer 
all knowledge back to the truth of man himself’).34 With respect to this second group, note that 
such ‘referring back’ is ambiguous: depending on whether ‘man’ is understood from a 
transcendental or empirical perspective, the expression can equally allude to the foundational 
logic of the Copernican turn (e.g. referring empirical contents to their a priori conditions of 
possibility) or to the circular dynamic of the analytic of finitude (e.g. referring epistemic 
conditions themselves to the causal determinations that bear on man as an empirical being). In the 
first case, ‘referring all knowledge back to the truth of man’ becomes tantamount to ‘using him as 
a starting point to reach truth’. In this regard, it would hardly be controversial to suggest that most 
of the post-Kantian developments that focused on the foundational role of the subject followed 
from the characterisation of the transcendental in the Critique of Pure Reason. Certainly this is 
the way Foucault himself reads the rise ⎯ and, in his view, failure ⎯ of German idealism (in 
particular Fichte) and both the Husserlian and Sartrian branches of phenomenology.35  By 
contrast, if one construes the ‘truth of man himself’ as referring to the empirical aspect of ‘man’, 
then in this case too the proposed strategy can find purchase in that Foucault understands 
positivism to be doing just this, and consequently to be a naturalistic reduction of ‘man’s 
transcendental side to its empirical aspect: thus ‘this true discourse finds its foundation and model 
in the empirical truth whose genesis in nature and in history it retraces, so that one has an analysis 
of the positivist type’ (OT: 320). As I have shown elsewhere (Han-Pile: 2005), Foucault criticises 
such an attempt for its essentialism, and for unduly turning ‘man’ into a mere object of nature. 
 As for the second group, the practical theories that promote the idea of a ‘reign’ or ‘liberation’ 
of man, they too can be seen as an inheritance of the Kantian emphasis on transcendental finitude, 
historically and possibly conceptually. The early Foucault emphasises the historical filiation and 
refers such theories to Hegel and Marx (DE I: 540). He targets the use of human freedom as the 
main hermeneutic category to understand historical development, first in Kant’s Idea for a History 
from a Cosmopolitan Point of View and then in dialectical form by Hegel and Marx. This also 
underlies his attacks against more recent movements such as the humanist readings of historical 
34 These themes are developed in numerous other passages such as the following: ‘when one analyses the 
language of man, one doesn’t discover the nature, essence or freedom of man. In their stead, one discovers 
unconscious structures which govern us without our noticing or willing it’ (‘Interview avec Michel 
Foucault’, 1968, DE I: 656).  
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materialism36 and what he calls, by opposition to the Ecole des Annales and the then new ‘histoire 
sérielle’, ‘continuous history’ (AK: 12). The link with the foundational logic of the analytic of 
finitude is particularly clear in the following passage: ‘continuous history is the indispensable 
correlate of the founding function of the subject: (...) the promise that one day the subject, ⎯ in 
the form of historical consciousness ⎯ will once again be able to appropriate [itself] (...). In 
various forms, this theme has played a constant role since the 19th century: to preserve, against all 
decenterings, the sovereignty of the subject and the twin figures of anthropology and humanism’ 
(AK: 12). Foucault goes on to denunciate various historical surges of this ‘founding function of the 
subject’, in the guise of the search for a total history (against Nietzschean genealogy), the 
anthropologisation of Marx (against such non humanist readings as Althusser’s) or the more recent 
‘reactivation’ of dialectical readings of historical development as the ‘hard work of freedom’ (a 
thinly veiled allusion to Sartre).37 The central role attributed to human freedom is deemed doubly 
nefarious: it leads to the epistemological mistake which consists in ignoring the causal 
determinations that bear on human beings, and it generates fallacious normative ideals focused on 
the idea of authenticity as the return to man’s true nature38: ‘because it is a philosophy of history, 
(...) of human practice (...), of alienation and of reconciliation (...), dialectics promises human 
beings, so to speak, that they will become true and authentic men. It promises man to man, and 
insofar as it does this, it is not dissociable from a humanist moral.’ (DE I: 540).39  
 
35 For an interesting but polemical reconstruction, see J. Habermas, ‘The Critique of Reason as an Unmasking 
of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault’, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1987; for a more neutral account, see B. Han-Pile (2005).  
36 Such as Gramsci’s and Lukacs. For a useful briefing, see Soper (1997), 96-119. 
37 See for example: ‘the analytic reason from the 17th century was essentially characterised by its reference to 
nature; the dialectical reason of the 19th century developed mostly in reference to existence, i.e. to the 
problem of the relations between the individual and society, consciousness and history, praxis and life, sense 
and non sense, life and the inert (DE I: 542).  
38 During his genealogical period, Foucault develops this early criticism of the moralising tendency of 
humanism by means of a hermeneutics of suspicion which sees it as a cover for the real (and far less moral) 
intentions of the 18th century prison reformers: ‘here the principle takes root that one should never apply 
‘inhumane’ punishment to a criminal who, nevertheless, may well be a traitor and a monster. If the law 
must now treat in a ‘humane’ way an individual who is ‘outside nature’ (…), it is not on account of some 
profound humanity that the criminal conceals within him, but because of necessary regulation of the effects 
of power. It is this ‘economic’ rationality that must calculate the penalty and prescribe the appropriate 
techniques. ‘Humanity’ is the respectable name given to this economy and to its meticulous calculations. 
‘Where punishment is concerned, the minimum is ordered by humanity and counseled by policy’ (DP: 92). 
This corresponds to what Frazer calls the ‘strategic’ objections to humanism. However, note that such 
objections do not form the philosophical core of Foucault’s denunciation of humanism, which is grounded 
in his reading of the analytic of finitude. 
39 Note, however, that the link between transcendental finitude and post-Kantian theories of freedom is not 
merely historical. This is suggested by the later Foucault, although he does not explicitly supply the 
connection: ‘after Descartes one has a subject of knowledge which presents Kant with the problem of 
C:\Documents and Settings\beatrice\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\OLK544\The 'Death of Man' - Foucault and Humanism.doc 10/20/09 + 9:30 
AM 
17 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 I do not have the space in this paper to examine whether the strategy just outlined is valid. 
The above suggests that it is at least possible to conceive of the missing links that would show the 
dependency of the various humanist conceptions attacked by Foucault on ‘man’. If such a 
derivation was indeed correct, and if one accepts Foucault’s conclusions in the Order of Things 
about the pernicious character of the analytic of finitude, then there would be some weighty 
reasons to endorse his criticism of humanism. Yet such reasons are not provided directly by 
Foucault’s analyses and require a large amount of reconstruction. Furthermore, there remain some 
significant difficulties with the reasons that are given. Let me point out three. Firstly, even if one 
leaves aside the issue of the missing link between ‘man’ and humanist man, Foucault’s negative 
pronouncements about the value and future of humanism ultimately rest on two factors: his 
identification of the theoretical flaws of the analytic of finitude, and his belief in the imminent 
erasure of ‘man’ as an epistemic structure. Yet the status of the former is made ambivalent by the 
fact that Foucault moves implicitly from case studies illustrating the failures of the analytic of 
finitude to apodictic claims about such failures being necessary. This apodictic dimension is 
denoted by various statements such as the following: ‘anthropology as an analytic of man has 
certainly played a constitutive role in modern thought, since to a large extent we are still not free 
 
determining the relation between the moral subject and the subject of knowledge. There was considerable 
discussion during the Enlightenment as to whether these two subjects were different or not. Kant’s solution 
was to find a universal subject who, insofar as it is universal, can be a subject of knowledge but which also 
demanded an ethical attitude’ (DE IV: 411 [EST: 279])39. One could flesh out this comment by focusing on 
the introduction of the notion of ‘transcendental freedom’ in the ‘Transcendental Dialectics’ and in the 
‘Canon of Pure Reason’. Such freedom is carefully distinguished from ‘practical freedom’ (as arbitrium 
liberum), of which it is the ground. While the latter is a psychological kind of freedom which can ultimately 
be compatible with determinism (we could be determined by natural causes but experience this, 
psychologically speaking, as self-determination), transcendental freedom involves a genuine spontaneity 
(and not just the empirical feeling of the action being spontaneous) which cannot be experienced 
empirically. Such spontaneity cannot be located within time and must be conceived of as an intelligible, 
noumenal form of causality (CRP: 332). This is where the connection between freedom and what I have 
called, following Foucault’s hint, transcendental finitude, is the most palpable: the reason lies in the central 
part played in noumenal causality by transcendental apperception. As it is well known, for Kant the 
formation of empirical knowledge is made possible by the understanding’s spontaneous capacity to unify 
sensory data under a concept (by judging or ‘taking something as’). This involves a special kind of self-
awareness which Kant calls ‘transcendental apperception’ (the ‘I think’ that accompanies all my 
representations): such self awareness is non empirical (I cannot observe myself judging) and constitutive of 
the possibility of our knowing anything empirical. The crucial point, as far as the link between 
transcendental finitude and freedom is concerned, is that transcendental apperception is equally important 
for noumenal causality insofar as the latter entails the ability to decide between competing maxims (as 
opposed to being determined by the ‘pathological’ inclinations of sensibility. The formulation of such 
maxims involves first order judgments, and the decision between competing maxims itself takes the form of 
a second order judgment (the taking of a particular maxim as an imperative). Therefore there are at least 
some plausible reasons to support the later Foucault’s view that post-Kantian theories of freedom are an 
exploration of transcendental finitude not just historically, but also conceptually. 
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from it. It became necessary at the moment when representations lost the power to determine (...) 
the interplay of its syntheses and analyses. It was necessary for empirical syntheses to be 
performed elsewhere than within the sovereignty of the ‘I think’. They had to be required (...) in 
man’s finitude’ (OT: 340, my italics). 40 Yet nothing in the Order of Things shows that the 
anthropological turn was necessary, only (at best) that it did happen. As Foucault said himself, the 
Critique carried within itself ‘the peril of an anthropology’ (previously quoted, my italics). That 
such peril did actualise itself does not mean that it had to: facts cannot ground apodictic claims. 
The most that has been shown is that the coexistence of the empirical and the transcendental 
within ‘man’ did encourage the sort of slippage typical of the analytic of finitude, but not that it 
necessarily caused it. Thus there is a deep ambivalence in the Order of Things, which can be read 
either as a de facto narrative that shows the various ways in which the anthropological turn has 
been detrimental to contemporary thought, or as a de jure indictment of ‘man’ as necessarily 
leading to the analytic of finitude. This leaves the possibility of rescuing humanism from 
anthropology: even if s/he accepted Foucault’s criticism of ‘man’, the humanist could still retort 
that although it is unfortunate that the Copernican turn ended up in the analytic of finitude, there 
is no reason to think that the empirico-transcendental structure is intrinsically flawed. In other 
words, the way would still be open for a type of humanism more aware of the dangers of 
anthropology and keen to preserve the separation of the empirical and the transcendental. Sartre’s 
early phenomenology, with its emphasis on the purely nihilating power of consciousness and the 
impossibility to identify it with any empirical content whatsoever (in the ‘Transcendence of the 
Ego’), could be read precisely as attempting this sort of theoretical move.   
 Secondly, similar modal difficulties arise in relation to another problem, namely that of the 
implicit normativity of Foucault’s analyses of anthropology. As it is well known, one of the 
principles of archaeology as a method lies in its neutrality (by opposition to optimistic narratives 
focused on progress): for example in the Order of Things Foucault is very careful to avoid any 
value judgment that would give Buffon’s natural history pre-eminence over Aldrovandi’s mixed 
recordings of facts, hearsay and myths about animals. Thus Foucault claimed to be an 
40 The same emphasis on apodicticity in present in other passages: thus ‘the recent rapprochement [of 
Marxism and phenomenology] is not of the order of a tardy reconciliation: at the level of archaeological 
configurations they were both necessary ⎯ and necessary to one another ⎯ from the moment the 
anthropological postulate was constituted, i.e. from the moment when man appeared as an empirico-
transcendental doublet’ (OT: 322-3, my italics). More generally, the empirico-transcendental replication 
characteristic of the analytic of finitude itself is seen as necessary: thus man is a ‘paradoxical figure in which 
the empirical contents of knowledge necessarily release, of themselves, the conditions that have made them 
possible’ (OT: 322, my italics). 
C:\Documents and Settings\beatrice\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\OLK544\The 'Death of Man' - Foucault and Humanism.doc 10/20/09 + 9:30 
AM 
19 
 
 
                                                     
‘ethnographer of our culture’ (DE I: 605 [RC: 91]), a detached theorist retracing the genesis of the 
current épistémè and identifying the consequences of its being grounded in the ‘mode of being’ of 
‘man’. Yet for all his self-professed archaeological neutrality, there is also a strongly normative 
aspect to his analysis: ‘the heaviest inheritance that comes to us from the 19th century ⎯ and 
from which it is time to get rid off ⎯ is humanism. (...) Humanism pretends to solve problems that 
it can’t pose!’ (DE I: 514). Correlatively, his avowed aim was to ‘announce the first deterioration in 
European history of the anthropological and humanist episode that we have known during the 
19th century’ (DE I: 502 [FL 16]) and to ‘define a method of analysis purged of all anthropologism’ 
(AK: 16).41 Just like those of the humanists he attacked, Foucault’s views oscillate between 
descriptive and normative registers. Somewhat ironically, this oscillation is one of the reproaches 
he makes to Sartre: ‘Sartre wanted to show that everywhere there is meaning [sens]. But (...) this is 
both an observation and an order’ (DE I: 514). Apart from the question of how such normative 
claims can be grounded42 (which takes us back to the previous issue of the assertoric/apodictic 
slippage), this exhibits a tension between the archaeologist’s theoretical ideal of detached 
neutrality and his practice. It is one thing to diagnose the death of ‘man’, and another to rejoice at 
⎯ let alone try to precipitate ⎯ the demise of the patient… 
41 The same normativity is at play in Foucault’s announcements about the return of language: ‘If this same 
language is now emerging with greater and greater insistence in a unity that we ought to think but cannot 
as yet do so, is this not the sign that the whole of this configuration is about to topple, and that man is in the 
process of perishing as the being of language continues to shine ever brighter over our horizon?’ (OT: 386, 
my italics). 
42 Many commentators have argued, although in connection with the later work, that such grounding is 
both impossible from and incompatible with Foucault’s approach. See for example Frazer (1985) but mostly 
J. Habermas, ‘Questions Concerning the Theory of Power’, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987) in particular p. 88-96. I do not have the space here to enter this particular 
debate, which anyway is not directly relevant to this paper (as it bears on Foucault’s conception of power). 
It should be noted, however, that the objections presented rest on two implicit (and questionable) premises: 
a) that such grounding should be universal and b) that since Foucault cannot (or refuses to) provide this sort 
of grounding, the only alternative for him is a nihilistic form of relativism. See for example: ‘Genealogy (...) 
takes the side of those who resist established practices of power. From this position of counterpower, it gains 
a perspective that is supposed to go beyond the perspectives of the given possessors of power. From this 
perspective, it is supposed to be able to transcend all validity claims that are only constituted in the 
enchanted circle of power. (...) Foucault’s concept of power does not permit such a concept of counterpower 
that grants cognitive privilege on the basis of a philosophy of history. (...) Those who conquer the 
theoretical avant garde of today (...) cannot validate for their knowledge any superiority according to 
standards of truth claims that would transcend local agreements.’ (Habermas , 92-93, my italics). Habermas 
concludes that Foucault’s only response is to ‘profess his allegiance to an embattled perspectivism’ (ibidem); 
but it is not clear that perspectivism is thus embattled: the absence of universal standards does not 
necessarily mean that all perspectives are equivalent, or that no normative judgment is possible. From 
Foucault's standpoint, it is more likely to imply that the robust conception of normativity presupposed by 
Habermas' objections needs to be revised. 
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 Thus humanists could argue that Foucault did not practice what he preached, and that his 
discourse was no less normative than theirs; furthermore, even if they accepted his indictment of 
the analytic of finitude, they could still weasel out of the archaeologist’s clutches by slipping 
through the gap between the assertoric and the apodictic. Yet there is a third set of difficulties. 
Foucault sought to bolster his attacks against humanism by pointing out that (regardless of 
whether it was intrinsically or only incidentally detrimental to thought) ‘man’ as a structure was 
on its way out anyway: if this was the case, then all movements grounded in this épistémè 
(including humanism) were bound to sink with the empirico-transcendental ship. Thus ‘as soon as 
one realised that all human knowledge, all human existence (…) are trapped within structures, i.e. 
within a formal system of elements which obey formal relations that anyone can describe, man so 
to speak ceases to be his own subject. (…) One discovers that what makes man possible is at the 
end of the day a set of structures, structures that he may be able to describe but of which he is not 
the subject or the sovereign consciousness’ (DE I: 601 sq [RC: 87 sq]).43 Thus the rise of 
structuralism and the displacement of humanist concepts were seen as indications that the analytic 
of finitude is loosening its grip on modernity and that we are on the brink of an epistemic shift 
which will bring into being a new historical a priori, that of the ‘return of language’ (OT: 384; 
more generally see p. 383-386). However there are two problems with this argument. Firstly, it is 
somewhat circular: on the one hand the withdrawal of ‘man’ as an épistémè is used to predict the 
doom of humanist conceptions of man; on the other, the demise of such conceptions is seen as 
indicative of the imminent death of ‘man’. What counts as a premise in the first part of the 
reasoning becomes a conclusion in the second, and vice versa. Secondly, if one takes seriously the 
43 See also: ‘what traverses us profoundly, what is before us, is the system, (...) a set of relations which 
maintain and transform themselves independently from the things they connect. (...) Lacan’s importance 
comes from the fact that he showed how, through the patient’s discourses and the symptoms of his neurosis, 
structures, the very system of language ⎯ and not the subject ⎯ are what speaks. (...) The ‘I’ exploded (see 
modern literature) ⎯ it is the discovery of the ‘there is’ [il y a]. There is a ‘one’ [‘on’] (...). Instead of putting 
man in the place of God [an allusion to Derrida’s criticism of Sartre in the Ends of Man], an anonymous 
thought, knowledge without a subject (DE I: 514). See also : ‘this notorious man, this human nature or this 
human essence or these specific features of man [ce propre de l’homme], were never found. When the 
phenomena of madness or neurosis were analysed, what was found is an unconscious (...) which had 
nothing to do with what could be expected of human essence (...), an unconscious which (...) functioned as a 
language. And as a result man was evaporating precisely insofar as he was stalked in his own depths [traqué 
dans ses profondeurs]’ (DE I: 663-664 [FL: 52]). On the godlike place attributed by humanism to man, see 
also: ‘yet the man-subject, man as the subject of his own consciousness or freedom, is, at the end of the day, 
a kind of correlative image of God. 19th century man is God incarnated in humanity. (...) And Nietzsche is 
the one who, by denouncing the death of God, denounced at the same time this God-like man the 19th 
century had not ceased to dream about’ (DE I: 664 [FL: 53]). On the anonymity of thought and of language, 
see Foucault’s study of Blanchot in The Thought of the Outside and his work on Raymond Roussel, French 
& European Publications: 1992. 
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characterisation of ‘man’ as the historical a priori which has formed the condition of possibility of 
knowledge since the end of the 18th century, then the logic which consists in using empirical 
observations to infer its disappearance is somewhat dubious: by definition transcendental 
conditions are immune to empirical refutation. Of course, one could answer this objection by 
pointing out that ‘man’ (like all épistémès) is not a purely transcendental structure but a historical 
a priori: by virtue of its historical dimension it is susceptible to being affected by empirical 
changes. Yet such a reply would come at a significant theoretical cost, namely the replication, at a 
meta-level, of the slippage between the empirical and the transcendental characteristic of the 
analytic of finitude itself: the only way in which empirical changes could affect the epistemic 
determination provided by ‘man’ as a historical a priori would be if such determination turned 
out, at the end of the day, to be causally determined by empirical processes. These would thus 
have exactly the same ‘quasi-transcendental’ function as that which Foucault attributes to the 
empirical contents which ‘release their conditions of possibility’ in the analytic of finitude. In this 
case, the humanist could retort that even on Foucault’s own terms, his pessimistic 
pronouncements about the disappearance of ‘man’ (and subsequent indictments of the humanist 
notions that are supposed to depend on this épistémè) ends up formally replicating the very 
structure of what it criticises, and thus could be seen as a further development (rather than a way 
out) of the analytic of finitude44: ‘man’ may have a greater life expectancy than anticipated.  
 
 So what are we to make of the whole debate? It seems clear from the analyses above that 
neither his opponents nor Foucault himself had any decisive arguments to offer for or against 
humanism. The failure of the first rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of archaeology as a 
method, and of Foucault’s correlative characterisation of ‘man’ as the empirico-transcendental 
double and of the analytic of finitude as our most recent epistemic ground. The objections 
presented to him failed to hit their mark because they took his statements about the ‘death of man’ 
at face value and read into them various conceptions of man (as a person or a free consciousness) 
which for the archaeologist were merely derivative of the appearance of ‘man’ as the empirico-
transcendental double: to use a metaphor dear to Foucault, the humanist objections pertained to 
the ‘surface’ of history, whereas the archaeologist was concerned with its depths. Yet conversely 
Foucault’s attacks on humanism did not fare much better, although for different reasons: while he 
presented a very interesting reconstruction of how the ambiguity of ‘man’ as a double made it 
44 See B. Han (2001), in particular part I, chapter 2.   
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possible for the Copernican turn to evolve into the analytic of finitude, a process which resulted in 
the anthropological sleep, he did not provide any explicit account of how the various humanist 
conceptions of man are related to ‘man’. The consequence is that while the reader may end up 
convinced that the anthropological turn was indeed nefarious for various branches of philosophy, 
the humanist can still argue that so long as this charting of the depths of history by the 
archaeologist is not explicitly connected to surface developments, its conclusions are no objection 
to humanist conceptions of man. Furthermore, the modality of Foucault’s criticism of humanism 
oscillates between the apodictic and the assertoric, the normative and the descriptive: as we saw, 
he formulates no grounds (universal or otherwise) for such normativity, and the description as it 
stands does not suffice. At best, his indictment of humanism remains promissory. 
 Can we learn anything from this double impasse? Hopefully, yes. For one thing, it provides an 
a contrario insight into the nature of real philosophical exchange. As we saw, the debate about the 
death of man was not a genuine dialogue but rather a case of philosophers talking (voluntarily or 
not) at cross purposes. To a large extent, the reason for this is that they mostly relied on the 
ambiguity of the term ‘man’ rather than to try to clarify their own use of the concept in relation to 
other possible uses (and in particular their opponents’). In reality, the so-called debate was an 
exercise in solipsism. This can certainly be seen as a failure of communication and a striking 
illustration of what philosophical exchanges should not be ⎯ somewhat unsurprisingly, the 
controversy died down without having being resolved. However, on a more positive note the 
debate brought to light two important issues which were influential on Foucault’s philosophical 
development and resurfaced in his later remarks about humanism. Importantly, they did so in 
ways which transformed the terms of the early debate by allowing for the possibility of a 
rapprochement, albeit not so much in terms of the conceptual contents involved as with respect to 
the values upheld.45 Thus the later Foucault’s work on subjectivity and freedom, even though it is 
still explicitly cast in opposition to humanism, may be seen as an implicit attempt to retain what 
Habermas would call the latter’s ‘emancipatory force’ while forging a non metaphysical content 
45 Some interpreters see Foucault as a nihilist who does not uphold any values at all and ends up in an 
incoherent position (see C. Taylor: ‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth’, in Hoy (ed), Foucault: A Critical 
Reader, Blackwell, 1986). Although I do not have the space to enter this debate, it seems clear to me from 
the quotes below and more generally from Foucault’s later emphasis on freedom that he does, although 
what he means by the latter differs from the autonomy central both to the post-Kantian tradition and its 
reworking by the Frankfurt school (as dialogic rather than monologic). For a defence of this, see J. 
Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy, N.Y.: Columbia UP, 1988  
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for its central concepts.46 Let me explain: as it is well known, at the end of the seventies Foucault 
decided to refocus his genealogical studies on the project of a ‘history of subjectivity’ (‘Michel 
Foucault’, DE IV: 634 [AME: 461]). Such a history focused on the dynamic tensions between 
problematisations of the self, relations of power and forms of knowledge. It involved a redefinition 
of the subject, not as a ‘substance’ but as a ‘form which is neither mostly nor always identical to 
itself’ (DE IV: 718 [EST: 290]). Such a definition was openly designed to avoid the foundationalist 
and essentialist aspects of humanism denounced in Foucault’s early work: ‘one must also skirt the 
philosophical approach which consists in going up, towards a constituting subject which must 
account for what any object of knowledge in general can be; on the contrary, one must go 
downwards, towards the study of the concrete practices whereby the subject is constituted in the 
immanence of a domain of knowledge’ (DE IV: 634 [AME: 462]).47 Consequently the later work 
developed in a different, more genealogical direction and proposed a historical critique focused on 
the mutual variability of subject/object relations, itself referred to changes in social practices48:  
‘my aim’, Foucault now tells us, ‘will be to show you how social practices can come to generate 
domains of knowledge which make not only new objects, new concepts, new techniques appear, 
but also totally new forms of subjects and of subjects of knowledge’ (DE II: 539 [P: 2]). Thus in ‘La 
vérité et les formes juridiques’ (DE II: 630 sq) Foucault looks at the transformations brought 
within the judicial domain by the simultaneous appearance of a new form of objectivity and a new 
type of subjectivity: the former lies in the idea that proofs can be established by gathering facts 
which will serve for the evaluation of the truth claims put forward by the parties in dispute (as 
46 One may object here that Foucault was distrustful of the idea of ‘liberation’: ‘I have always been a little 
wary about the general theme of liberation insofar as (...) it risks referring to the idea that there is a human 
nature or ground which found itself, due to certain historical, economic and social processes, masked, 
alienated or imprisoned in repressive mechanisms’ (DE IV: 709-710 [EST: 282]). However note that this 
distrust was not inspired by the desire to reject the concept of freedom as an ideal but by the worry that 
liberation may come to be seen as its sole content (which would be the correlate of seeing power as solely 
repressive): ‘It is well known that this practice of liberation is not enough to define practices of freedom 
which will then be necessary so that this people, this society or these individuals can define acceptable (...) 
forms for their existence or political society. This is why I insist on practices of freedom rather than on 
processes of liberation which, once again, have their place but cannot, on their own, define all the practical 
forms of freedom’ (ibidem [ibidem: 282-3]).  
47 See also: ‘one must also inverse the philosophical approach which consists in going up towards a 
constituting subject which is asked for an account of what any object of knowledge in general can be; on the 
contrary, one must go down, towards the study of concrete practices through which the subject is 
constituted in the immanence of a domain of knowledge. (...) This refusal [of appealing to a constituting 
subject] has for its aim to uncover the processes specific to an experience in which subject and object 
transform each other and through each other’ (DE IV: 634 [AME: 462]).  
48 ‘It is ‘practices’, understood as modes of acting and thinking at the same time, which provide the key to 
the intelligibility of the correlative constitution of the subject and the object’ (DE IV: 635 [AME: 463]).  
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opposed to such proofs being dependent on the word and social status of individuals vouching for 
either party). Correlatively, the new type of subjectivity resides in the idea of a detached, neutral 
observer occupying an ‘ideal point’ (631). In both cases, the new social practice that proved 
historically determining is the inquiry [enquête]. 
 However the adoption of this new focal point and method signals an important change vis-à-
vis the earlier position: like the humanists (and unlike his younger self), the later Foucault now 
acknowledges the importance of the notion of subjectivity to understand human practices. At the 
same time, starting from these practices and emphasising the reciprocity and historical plasticity of 
subject/object relations allows him to develop a theory of the subject which transforms the notion 
and avoids the pitfalls denounced in the early work: it does not treat such a subject as an invariant 
starting point, nor as the ground of knowledge. 49 As a consequence, the dangers of the empirico-
transcendental replication specific to the analytic of finitude are much less likely to arise. Thus by 
giving up on the essentialism and the foundational ambitions inherited from the Copernican turn, 
Foucault flushes out the anthropological bath water but retains the proverbial baby. In this sense, 
the notorious ‘return of the subject’ does not contradict his early attacks against the dominance of 
the subject on the post-war philosophical scene. On the contrary, it puts forward a promising 
alternative to think of subjects in a non metaphysical, non essentialist way; moreover, by doing so 
it opens the possibility of identifying a new common ground between Foucault and humanists. 
 This is made apparent by his later reflections on the possibility and nature of free agency 
(which is so central to humanism): as we saw, at the time of the debate about the ‘death of man’ 
Foucault simply seemed to deny the existence of freedom, arguing that individuals are 
unconsciously determined by various structures (social or linguistic, for example) over which they 
have no control. Yet the theme acquires a much greater importance in the later work and becomes 
central to the definitions of both power and subjectivity: thus the crucial difference between 
power and violence is that the former can only act on free agents. It not only presupposes but 
requires the possibility of resistance. Correlatively, freedom is seen as an intrinsic property of 
human beings and is identified with our ability for self problematisation (effecting a ‘permanent 
creation of ourselves in our autonomy’ (DE IV: 572 [EST: 313]). While this ability is constrained 
49 Thus Foucault denounces the ‘very grave fault’ which consists in ‘presupposing, at the end of the day, that 
the human subject, the subject of knowledge, and the forms of knowledge themselves are in a way already 
and definitely pre-given, and that economic, social and political conditions of existence only deposit and 
imprint themselves in that definitely given subject’ (DE II: 539 [P: 2]). 
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by specific historical conditions50, it nevertheless involves the possibility of spontaneous action (in 
particular through the creative transformation of such practices).51 Just like his later definition of 
subjectivity, Foucault's new understanding of freedom as a plastic, creative ability is meant to 
avoid essentialism (in the sense that it is purely formal and does not identify such ability with any 
of its historical forms). Foucault explicitly contrasts it with the more substantive conceptions of 
freedom underlying humanist positions: ‘what frightens me, in humanism, is that it presents a 
certain form of our ethics as a universal model, valid for any type of freedom. I think that our 
future includes more secrets, more possible freedoms and inventions than humanism allows us to 
imagine’ (DE IV: 782 [TS: 15]). Note, however, that the target of Foucault’s criticism is not the 
(rather humanist) idea that freedom should be a central value to human development ⎯ the title 
of one of Foucault’s last interventions (‘The Care of the Self as A Practice of Freedom’) attests to 
this ⎯, but rather the limited and morally constraining conception allegedly put forward by 
humanists. The disagreement about the nature of freedom should not conceal a certain 
communality of ideals.  
 In this respect, it may be useful to point out ⎯ last but not least ⎯ that Foucault's emphasis 
on the centrality of freedom and plasticity of human self creation is not quite as original as it may 
seem. In fact, it was typical of the one kind of humanism that he never discussed, namely that of 
the Renaissance.52 Following Blumenberg (1983) (and to a lesser extent Craig: 1987), Cooper 
(2002: 25 sq) reads the revival of the humanities from the 14th century onwards as a reaction 
against the crisis generated by Ockham’s scepticism towards the Augustinian confidence in the 
power of human reason, which he replaced with a ‘fascination for God’s absolute and 
unconstrained power’ (Cooper: 26). From this emerged, instead of the orderly Augustinian world 
of ideas, fully accessible to the powers of the human mind, the bleak picture of an opaque universe 
ruled by the iron will of an unintelligible God, in which man had no particular privilege or 
place.53 The main reaction to this desolate vision was the Renaissance’s emphasis on ‘self assertion’ 
50 Thus ‘the [practices of the self] are not something that the individual invents himself. They are schemas 
that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested, imposed by his culture, his society or his 
social group’. (DE IV: 718 [EST: 291]). 
51 ‘The subject constitutes itself through practices of subjugation [assujettissement], or, in a more 
autonomous fashion, through practices of liberation, of freedom, as in Antiquity’ (DE IV: 733 [FL 452]).  
52 In the whole corpus I could only find one very brief allusion to J. Burckhardt’s interpretation of the 
Renaissance: ‘during the Renaissance one also sees (...) that the hero is his own work of art. The idea that 
one may turn one’s life into a work of art is an idea which is incontestably foreign to the Middle Ages and 
which appeared with the Renaissance’. (DE IV: 410 [EST: 278]). 
53 This picture is seen by Cooper as the inheritor of the first Gnostics, who thought that ‘the true God is 
beyond the created universe and quite alien to it’ (Cooper: 25). Similarly, for Ockham God is a ‘hidden God’, 
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(Blumenberg), which answered the challenge posed by the displacement of man as a knowing 
agent by refocusing on the human potential for creativity. In this shift from contemplation to 
agency, what came to be seen as characteristic of man are his creative abilities, deemed to mirror 
God’s own and not to be bound by any particular nature or limits.54 This is particularly visible in 
Pico Della Mirandola’s reworking of the myth of Epimetheus in his Oratio, in which God 
addresses man as follows: ‘we have given to thee, Adam, no fixed seat, no form of thy own, no gift 
peculiarly thine, that thou mayest feel as thine own, have as thine own, possess as thine own, the 
seat, the form, the gifts which thou thyself shalt desire. A limited nature in other creatures is 
confined within the laws written down by Us. In conformity with thy free judgment, in whose 
hands I have placed thee, thou art confined by no bounds; and thou will fix the limits of nature for 
thyself.55 I have placed thee at the centre of the world, that from there thou mayest more 
conveniently look around and see whatsoever is in the world. Neither heavenly nor earthly, 
neither mortal nor immortal have We made thee. Thou, like a judge appointed for being 
honourable, art the molder and maker of thyself’ (Pico Della Mirandola, 4-5). While there are 
limits to the rapprochement56, this address strikes incredibly close chords to Foucault’s own 
rejection of essentialism (‘we have given thee… no form of thy own’) and emphasis on self 
creation (using an aesthetic paradigm echoed by Foucault’s analyses of dandysm, Pico concludes 
 
a being of arbitrary and infinite power, unbound by good or evil. By contrast, Cooper refers to the modern 
age as the ‘second overcoming of gnosticism’ (Cooper: 25). 
54 According to both Blumenberg and Cooper, this was accompanied with a new interest in the prime 
instruments of human creativity, namely language, work and the body. The rising interest in the natural 
world was also the correlate of this focus on human agents that move and travel in such a world. For more 
details, see Cooper: 45.  
55 Compare with: ‘for me, what must be produced is not man as nature would have designed him, or as his 
essence would prescribe; we must produce something which does not exist yet and of which we cannot 
know what it will be.’ (DE IV: 74 [P: 275]). 
56 The passage quoted ends in the following way: ‘Thou canst grow downward into the lower natures which 
are brutes. Though canst again grow upward from thy soul’s reason into the higher natures which are 
divine’. The subsequent pages make it clear that it is much more desirable for man to grow upward, towards 
the ‘first places’ beyond the ‘chamber of the world’, than to identify with the lower natures, and gives 
indications as to how this might be achieved: ‘let a certain holy ambition invade the mind, so that we may 
not be content with mean things but may aspire to the highest things and strive with all our forces to attain 
them: for if we will to, we can. Let us spurn earthly things: let us struggle towards the heavens. (...) Let us 
see what they [the seraphim, cherubim and thrones] are doing, what life they are living. If we too live that 
life ⎯ for we can ⎯ we shall equal their lot. The seraph burn with the fire of charity; they cherub shines 
with the radiance of intelligence; the throne stands in steadfastness of judgment. (...) Therefore, by rivalling 
the life of a cherub on the earth, by confining the onslaught of the affections by means of moral science, and 
by shaking off the mist of reason by means of dialectic, as if washing off the filth of ignorance and vice, let 
us purge the soul’. (Oratio, p. 7-9). Thus Pico’s emphasis on the plasticity of man is underwritten by a 
strongly normative conception of how this potential should evolve. Foucault would most certainly have 
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that ‘thou mayest sculpt thyself into whatever shape thou dost prefer’). Such closeness reinforces 
the suggestion that there may be much more of a common ground than is usually thought ⎯  and 
this time not just in terms of the values upheld but also of conceptual content ⎯  between 
Foucault’s mature views and at least some forms of humanism.  
 
objected to such a view, if only on account of its religious underpinnings (see for example ‘Structuralisme et 
post-structuralisme’, DE IV: 438-441 [AME: 440-442]).  
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